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Introduction 
 
 
The history of psychology faces an uncertain future in Britain in the second decade 
of the twenty-ﬁrst century. In some respects, its prospects appear healthy. Thanks to 
the mandatory inclusion of Conceptual and Historical Issues on the British 
Psychological Society accredited undergraduate psychology syllabus, for example, 
students studying in British universities now have an array of new history of psy- 
chology textbooks to choose from (Brysbaert & Rastle, 2012; Jones & Elcock, 
2001; Richards, 2009; Smith, 2013; Tyson, Jones, & Elcock, 2011). Over the same 
period, historians have produced an impressive array of theoretically informed 
works illustrating just how rich, nuanced, and informative the history of psychology 
is (e.g. Bunn, Lovie, & Richards, 2001; Hall, Pilgrim, & Turpin, 2015; Thomson, 
2006). Much has been done to answer the excoriating criticisms of earlier scholar- 
ship (Rose, 1989; Young, 1966). Bolstered by theoretical ideas developed over the 
last 30 years and explored further in this issue, there are powerful arguments for 
psychologists to take history seriously. 
In other respects, however, the area that explicitly links history and psychol- 
ogy, the history of psychology, is in distinct decline in Britain. Membership of the 
British Psychological Society’s History and Philosophy of Psychology Section 
has remained consistently low during a period of rapid expansion of the discipline 
as a whole. Only a tiny handful of professional historians of psychology attend the 
Annual Section Conference, which had to be cancelled in 2015 because of a 
dearth of submissions. Within British academic psychology it is currently more 
marginal than ever. It is unclear whether it will retain any sort of presence as a 
research area. Its future within British psychology is precarious, and it is clear 
that there are threats elsewhere too (Krampen, 2016). 
We argue that understanding the relations between history and psychology is not 
only a matter of developing ever richer accounts of the intellectual relations between 
the two areas, important though these are, but is also a matter of understanding the 
material conditions faced by those scholars for whom such conditions are increas- 
ingly problematic: historians of psychology. We are well aware that the term “mate- 
rial conditions” has echoes of Marxist analysis. We do not offer a Marxist account 
here though; for example, we do not examine relations of production, class rela- 
tions, or labour process, and we do not concentrate on power. Nor do we adopt the 
sociological usage that typically refers to more local conditions such as laboratory 
practices and the like. However, we wish to persevere with the term as capturing 
something of the type of circumstance with which we are concerned. It also intended 
to capture the idea that history of psychology is itself an historical category pro- 
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duced by social relations. We should also note that the history of psychology has as 
much of a claim to a place in the humanities as it does to one in departments of 
psychology. Indeed, this whole debate can be seen as part of the ongoing struggle to 
deﬁne the scope and nature of psychological science. For the current article, we are 
limiting our remarks to the place of history within psychology departments largely 
because of the strong arguments regarding history as being integral to psychology, 
some of which we recap before moving on to consider the impact of material condi- 
tions on the status of the area in the UK. 
 
 
 
A Theoretical Case 
 
 
In our view, there are cogent, compelling, and persuasive arguments for a history of 
psychology. One central set of contentions is around the nature of psychological 
concepts and psychological knowledge. Historians such as Kurt Danziger, Graham 
Richards, and Roger Smith have documented how the historical contingency of 
psychological categories renders them discursively unstable (Danziger, 1997; 
Hacking, 2007; Smith, 2005). Psychological language is burdened with meanings 
that echo earlier uses but also take on new ones within a particular social context 
(Richards, 1989). The apparent coherence of psychology’s subject matter is held 
together by language (e.g. metaphor and rhetoric; Leary, 1994) but also by practical 
techniques (e.g. operationism; Green, 1992; Rogers, 1989). The discursive ﬂexibil- 
ity of psychological categories means they can be applied (in business, educational, 
and health contexts) but also that they can become vehicles for the production and 
maintenance of speciﬁc visions for the social order. Historians such as Ellen Herman 
and Nikolas Rose have examined how practices fundamentally shaped by psy- 
chology have become integral to producing and governing categories of persons 
under conditions of solid and liquid modernity (Bauman, 2000; Herman, 1995; 
Rose, 1985, 1989). These practices emerge from particular social, cultural, and 
political circumstances and make possible different forms of subjectivity, person- 
hood, and “modal selves” (Susman, 1984). Historical conditions shape them but 
they also help to produce conditions of possibility for the emergence of new identi- 
ties. Psychology contributes to changing who we are, how we are acted upon, and 
how we act upon ourselves. 
Historical work has demonstrated that rather than discovering eternal truths, psy- 
chology is frequently, if not always, engaged in a project of investigating regulari- 
ties that are products of particular historical circumstances (Gergen, 1973). Such 
histories need not close off the possibility that there may be universal, external ref- 
erents that constrain our language and practice (though most critical historians are 
sceptical of such claims), but they do draw attention to how psychological concepts 
and practices have a fundamentally historical dimension. They also highlight the 
important connections between psychology and the objects of psychological study. 
As Roger Smith has put it: “When we develop our knowledge of human beings, we 
do not just change knowledge but potentially what it is to be human. It follows that 
psychology is not only the study of human thinking, feeling, acting, and interacting: 
it has itself—like any other human science—brought into being new ways of think- 
ing, feeling, acting, and interacting” (Smith, 2005, p. 56; also Richards, 1987, 
2002). As Nikolas Rose has claimed, humans are themselves historical and cultural 
artefacts (Rose, 1996, p. 22).1 Such claims, we believe, render history an inescap- 
able part of psychology. 
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These arguments for the fundamentally historical nature of psychology share 
intellectual roots and resonances with other historical and philosophical projects, be 
they Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language (Wittgenstein, 1953), Foucault’s “archae- 
ology” of knowledge and technologies of the self (Foucault, 1973, 1977, 1988), or 
Collingwood’s emphasis on the historical imagination in recapturing past patterns of 
thought (Collingwood, 1946). Scholars have also made links with sociological work 
on science ranging from the Edinburgh “strong programme” in the sociology of 
knowledge (Barnes, 1977; Bloor, 1976) to Actor Network Theory (Callon, Rip, & 
Law, 1986; Latour, 2005; Law & Hassard, 1999). Going back further, these histories 
of psychology also share with history of science a concern to shift away from exces- 
sive and unreﬂective celebration, presentism, and internalism. 
Perhaps the most radical claim is that much of psychology’s subject matter is 
unlike that of the natural sciences. Historians and philosophers have argued that there 
are fundamental differences between indifferent kinds (electricity, gravity, neurons, 
sodium chloride, and so on) and interactive kinds (personality, intelligence, neurosis, 
the taste of salt, and so on; the interactive–indifferent division is used by Hacking (1999) 
as a development of the more familiar natural versus human kinds differentiation). 
“Whereas in orthodox sciences there is always some external object of enquiry—rocks, 
electrons, DNA, stars—existing as essentially unchanging in the non-human world”, 
writes Graham Richards, “this is not so for Psychology” (Richards, 2002, p. 7). 
 
1 These arguments are well rehearsed in cultural and historical psychology but have made few 
inroads into Psychology Departments in the UK. 
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It would seem that psychology has for much of its history assumed that it is in the 
business of discovering and examining indifferent kinds when it is more appropriate 
to describe it as contributing to the construction of interactive kinds.2 
It is difﬁcult to imagine that there are psychological categories awaiting discov- 
ery, like gold nuggets embedded in rock strata. Nevertheless, the implied model of 
discovery still structures the tacit knowledge of many psychologists. Psychological 
research teams do not host press conferences to announce the discovery of hitherto 
unknown psychological entities, in contrast to the state of affairs in astrophysics, for 
example, when the discovery of gravitational waves was announced to the world’s 
press in February 2016. Psychology’s track record of producing laws is also modest. 
Even apparently renowned laws such as the Yerkes–Dodson law or the law of effect 
have been challenged or faced obsolescence through qualiﬁcation (Roediger, 2008; 
Teigen, 1994, 2002). Facts too are presented differently in psychology, compared to 
how they are in the natural sciences, always allowing scope for qualiﬁcation and the 
possibility of disagreement (Smyth, 2001). Morawski (1996) has argued that in 
grappling with the desire to construct a universal model of human subjectivity, early 
American psychology textbooks attempted to harmonise psychological with cultur- 
ally prescribed modes of subjectivity. “I don’t think psychology can ever dissociate 
itself from a certain normative program”, Foucault said in a 1965 interview: “Every 
psychology is a pedagogy, all decipherment is a therapeutics: you cannot know 
without transforming” (Foucault, 1998, p. 255). 
On this view it is more accurate to conceptualise psychological categories as 
emerging into discourse and becoming psychologised (Danziger, 1997; Goodey, 
2011), rather than being “discovered”. The meanings of interactive kind terms are 
always changing across time and place. Terms such as “race”, homosexual, ADHD, 
hysteria, nervous breakdown, and emotion all have a history and can be understood 
as interactive kinds (Arnaud, 2015; Barrett, 2006; Shorter, 2013; Somerville, 2000; 
Timimi, 2005). In addition, psychological categories are not refuted as such; they 
merely go out of fashion. Psychology abandons its categories when they are no 
longer socially useful or meaningful in the culture. Character, feebleminded, and 
hormic spring to mind (although character seems to be experiencing a revival, e.g. 
Furnham & Lester, 2012; Niemiec, 2013). Challenges have been mounted against 
the conceptual coherence of key psychological concepts such as attention (Anderson, 
2011), schizophrenia (Geekie & Read, 2009; Lasalvia, Penta, Sartorius, & 
Henderson, 2015), the storage metaphor of memory (Brockmeier 2010; Randall, 
2007), and “race” (Tate & Audette, 2001).3    Some concepts, such as “race”, have 
been sustained by powerful interests and not scientiﬁc ﬁndings or evidence-based 
 
 
2 Not all who are sympathetic to history of psychology believe this distinction to be essential or 
ultimately defensible. Smith (2007), for example, argues that in principle at least, all knowledge 
interacts with its objects (pp. 93–121; see also Khalidi, 2010; Tsou, 2007). There is insufﬁcient 
room here to explore these differences in detail. 
3 Psychology’s largely abandoned categories include accedie (with occasional revivals, e.g. in rela- 
tion to burnout in academics, Bartlett, 1994), apperception, chagrin, clairsentience, conation, drap- 
etomania, drive, habit, hysteria, instinct, limerence, moron, motivation, neurasthenia, psychon, 
race, sympathy, the will, and volition. 
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arguments (Sussman, 2014). The term’s ﬂexibility and biological ambiguity have 
enabled it to be co-opted into a variety of political projects. “Race” is a racist term. 
It matters profoundly which word one chooses to describe any human experi- 
ence, psychological state, or form of identity precisely because language contrib- 
utes to the phenomenology of personhood. Having a passion is not the same kind of 
thing as having an emotion; the joy one experiences on passing an exam is not the 
same as the joy at having given birth; melancholy is not the same as depression. 
Thus, terms like fantasy can, in some periods, be treated as fundamental psycho- 
logical categories, while in other periods they are either ignored or made technical 
and stripped of much of their former meaning (Cornejo, 2015; Dixon, 2003). 
Psychologists can become “servants of power” (Baritz, 1960) precisely because 
psychology’s constructs are sufﬁciently malleable to allow the many forms of power 
to function. Governmentality requires ﬂexibility (Dean, 1999). 
Unlike indifferent kinds which can exist outside of human culture and society, 
interactive kinds are made possible by a network of related discursive terms—a net- 
work that is a product of a particular human society and culture. All scientiﬁc objects 
from adenosine triphosphate to a high-pressure weather system are made possible by 
the epistemological networks they are embedded in (Daston, 2000). However, our 
understanding of gold’s electrical conductivity is meaningful only as a result of our 
prior knowledge of the laws of electricity. In this epistemological sense, our knowl- 
edge of gold is “discursive”. But nuggets buried in the rock pre-existed human cul- 
ture and society and awaited discovery. Gold is (literally) a malleable metal, capable 
of being melted and poured into a mould or beaten into thin sheets. By contrast, 
human categories of selfhood are (metaphorically) only malleable in the signiﬁcant 
and different sense of coming into existence necessarily and sufﬁciently within 
human society. Indifferent kinds predate the evolution of human consciousness, 
whereas interactive kinds are made possible by language and culture. Wealth is a 
discursive construct whose meaning is as function of particular social arrangements 
and networks of power. Human beings interact with wealth in a totally different way 
compared to how they interact with gold (Brinkmann, 2005, p. 773). 
 
 
 
Creating a Market in UK Higher Education 
 
 
There are, then, powerful arguments regarding history as an intrinsic part of psy- 
chology. Nevertheless, as we noted at the beginning of our article, we have serious 
concerns over the viability of the relationship in the current British university cli- 
mate. Our worries arise from the conditions pertaining across the higher education 
sector. Over 20 years ago, Kurt Danziger reminded scholars that “tolerance for his- 
torical studies [of psychology] diminishes sharply as we enter the serious business 
of the discipline” (Danziger, 1994, p. 467). As Danziger implies, as soon as one 
enters the world of practice and decisions, such as who one should appoint to an 
academic post, well-intentioned beliefs in the value of history can quickly be side- 
lined. What was true in the 1990s is even more so in the early twenty-ﬁrst century. 
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To put it bluntly, the powerful intellectual arguments for history of psychology, to 
which we have alluded above, have not advanced the situation of history within the 
discipline of psychology. In our view, the success of the intellectual case has been 
undermined by practical and political constraints that have emerged in the last 20 
years. One particularly profound constraint stands out: the marketisation of the UK 
Higher Education sector in the context of the wider ideology of neoliberalism. It is 
to this wider context we now turn. 
Higher education has traditionally been publicly ﬁnanced in the UK with mini- 
mal or no tuition fees. Because the available number of university places was lim- 
ited, performance in national standardised exams (“A” levels) was the mechanism 
that allowed universities to select applicants. Until 1998, universities were still 
essentially publicly funded, and students’ tuition fees came from the public purse; 
limited fees were introduced from 2006 onwards. In 2009, the “Browne Review” or 
the Independent Review of Higher Education Funding and Student Finance was 
launched to consider the future direction of higher education funding in England. 
Initially commissioned by a Labour government, the committee published its ﬁnd- 
ings in October 2010, 6 months after the Conservative–Liberal Democratic coali- 
tion government came to power.4 Chaired by Lord Browne of Madingley, the review 
recommended wide-ranging changes to the system of university funding in England, 
including removing the cap on the level of fees and increasing the income level at 
which graduates must begin to pay back their loans. The Education Act of 2011 rati- 
ﬁed the proposal to increase the cap on annual tuition fees from £3290 to the maxi- 
mum of £9000, the rate that the majority of universities immediately started 
charging. Paradoxically, the proportion of young people going to university has 
jumped from approximately 15 % in the mid 1970s, when a student’s tuition fees 
were paid in full by government, to approximately 46 % in 2013, when fees were 
£9000 per annum.5 
There have been further efforts to extend the market into higher education, such 
as enabling private providers to compete in the market (Brown & Carasso, 2013). 
The attempt to create a market in higher education has resulted in the replacement 
of traditional ideals of intellectual autonomy, freedom, and ﬁnancial security with 
demands for brand creation, competitiveness, and precarious employment. 
Managerialism is changing the nature, scope, and ambition of academic work 
(Hyde, Clarke, & Drennan, 2012). Traditional assumptions about the professional 
role of academics are being challenged as both teaching and research practices are 
subjected to regimes of monitoring, assessment, and evaluation in terms of produc- 
tivity and efﬁciency. The result is that academics must now spend considerable time 
 
 
4 Securing a sustainable future for higher education: an independent review of higher education 
funding and student finance. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-browne-report- 
higher-education-funding-and-student-ﬁnance. Accessed 16 April 2016. 
5 See Times Higher Education, 23 July 2013, https://www.timeshighereducation.com/features/ 
participation-rates-now-we-are-50/2005873.article, and UK Government statistics at https://www. 
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/458034/HEIPR _ 
PUBLICATION_2013-14.pdf, both accessed 26 May 2016. 
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both accounting for their activities in a form that managers can utilise, as well as 
engaging in those activities that managers deem legitimate in the ﬁrst place. The 
true use value of scholarly labour is in decline, while the exchange value of pro- 
duced commodities, as measured by an array of metrics, is on the rise. 
As Lorenz (2012, p. 625) has concluded, managerialist discourse “is Orwellian in 
nature because it redeﬁnes concepts such as quality, accountability, transparency, 
and professionalism and perverts them into their opposites”. Orwellian or not, it is 
hardly surprising that the academy’s traditional values are being undermined. English 
universities are being repurposed as “engines of growth”, reshaped as centres of 
applied expertise and repositioned as subordinate to society’s “economic strategy” 
(Collini, 2012). The value of research, it is argued, must be measured in terms of its 
contribution to economic innovation. Teaching must be refocused to equip students 
with the vocational skills employers demand. The roles and expectations of academ- 
ics and students alike are being refashioned: academics become service providers as 
students become consumers (Molesworth, 2010; Williams, 2012). 
 
 
 
The Assessment of Research 
 
 
While higher education has arguably always been in transition, the tectonic politi- 
cal movements of globalisation and neoliberalism have led to the introduction of 
managerialist ideology, which operationalises all activities as calculable, govern- 
able, and transportable (Giroux, 2014). Implicitly or explicitly, scholars have 
always been concerned with the issue of the quality of their work. What is com- 
paratively new, certainly in terms of scale, is national governments initiating a 
process for assessing its quality. In the UK, this process has now been through six 
cycles, having started in 1986. The practice of performance-based research funding 
has now spread to (at least) another 14 countries (Bence & Oppenheim, 2005; 
Hicks, 2012). Characterised as state regulation of the research market, such exer- 
cises have determined the amount of research-related income universities receive 
from central government (Palfreyman & Tapper, 2014). The outcomes of research 
assessment exercises are expressed in various ways, but one particularly inﬂuential 
has been the production of national league tables for different subject areas, which 
are in turn used as markers of prestige. The results are held to have had effects on 
such things as the ability of institutions to attract the best qualiﬁed undergraduates, 
the most promising graduate students, and the most eminent staff (Owens, 2013). 
In sum, research assessments have become integral to the universities’ manage- 
ment of income and reputation. 
The Research Excellence Framework (REF), as it is currently called in the UK, 
remains controversial. Supporters point to positives such as accountability, higher 
research quality, increased productivity and value for money, and personal incen- 
tives to produce research of international repute. For example, the Higher Education 
Funding Council reported that the proportion of UK research judged to be “world 
leading” went from 14 to 22 % between the 2008 and 2014 assessments. In contrast, 
critics point to the frailties of assessment methods, the lack of consensus on how to 
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assess quality, and the shaping of considerations of research direction by the REF 
and associated metrics rather than the research question itself (Berche, Holovatch, 
Kenna, & Mryglod, 2015; Hug, Ochsner, & Daniel, 2014). Academic staff have also 
claimed that such exercises have distorted academic life, have been divisive, and 
have disadvantaged some (Harley, 2002; University and College Union, 2013). 
Understanding how the UK research assessment exercises have contributed to 
the marginalisation of history of psychology within psychology requires a little 
more explanation of how they have operated (we concentrate on the most recent 
exercise but note that the effects have been cumulative). For the 2014 REF, universi- 
ties submitted the work of their researchers to experts who had been chosen by the 
academic community. These assessors were organised into panels and then into 
subpanels or units of assessment. The work of a particular academic was sent to the 
unit of assessment (UoA) that was judged to be the most appropriate by the institu- 
tion. For psychology, the relevant UoA was entitled “Psychology, Psychiatry and 
Neuroscience”. (“History” had a UoA of its own. And it was possible for psycholo- 
gists to have their work submitted to other panels, and some did so.) Generally, 
submissions from university departments consisted of four publications from each 
researcher entered, a description of the research environment relating to the depart- 
ment, and case studies showing how research conducted within the department had 
had social and/or economic impact. Not all academic staff had to be submitted into 
the assessment: universities made strategic decisions about which staff to submit.6 
Submissions were graded by at least two members of each subpanel on the fol- 
lowing areas: excellence of the publications, the research environment, and the 
impact of research. For each department, each of these three areas was awarded a 
grade of 1*, 2*, 3*, or 4* (with a possible “unclassiﬁed” category) where 3* cor- 
responded to research demonstrating “Quality that is internationally excellent in 
terms of originality, signiﬁcance, and rigour, but which falls short of the highest 
standards of excellence” and 4* corresponded to “Quality that is world-leading in 
terms of originality, signiﬁcance, and rigour”. Only publications awarded the two 
highest grades, 3* and 4*, fed into subsequent calculations about ﬁnancial disburse- 
ment. However, all the ratings of submitted publications fed into a ﬁnal aggregate 
score, akin to a grade point average, for each department. While the intention was 
that publications would be assessed by people with expertise in the ﬁeld, in mar- 
ginal or underrepresented areas, there was a risk of this not happening. 
The economist Frederic Lee and his colleagues have argued over a number of 
years that one effect of research assessments on his discipline in British universi- 
ties has been to reduce variety, producing what they describe as a homogenisation 
of economic research. They attribute this to recursive relations between the assess- 
ment exercise, the economics panel, journal rankings, and decision-making within 
economics departments (Lee, 2007; Lee, Pham, & Gu, 2013). Lee et al. argue that 
entire areas of economics are effectively being marginalised and ignored. Recent 
work by Gunther Krampen supports a case for the history of psychology becoming 
similarly  less  prominent  (Krampen,  2016).  Using  the  PsycINFO  database, 
 
 
6 Nor did research-active academic staff have to submit to the REF panel associated with their home 
academic department. Some academics submitted their work through an adjunct department. 
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Krampen’s analysis indicates that the frequency of publications in the history of 
psychology has steadily declined (as a proportion of psychology publications) 
from the mid-1980s (1.09 %) to the last 5 years (2010–2014, 0.4 %). Repeating 
Krampen’s analysis but for UK-only publication would, we believe, reveal an even 
gloomier picture. This has led to a general unease that research assessment might 
stiﬂe some research, lead to risk-averse research directions, and elevate anticipa- 
tion of what will be rewarded in the assessment above doing the best research 
(Owens, 2013). 
In 2015, the Social Psychology Section of the British Psychological Society 
(BPS) commissioned a survey of its members’ experience of REF 2014. The survey 
found that social psychologists doing quantitative research were more likely to be 
submitted to REF than those doing qualitative research, that institutions were greatly 
swayed by the impact factors of journals when considering what work to submit, 
and that institutions were generally risk averse when considering submission of 
social psychological research based on qualitative or mixed methods. The survey 
concluded that the result of REF was “a narrow and methodologically impoverished 
representation of UK social psychology”. Margaret Wetherell, formerly Professor 
of Social Psychology at Loughborough and the Open Universities, characterised the 
situation for social psychology as one of “uncertain location, likely hardship, and a 
potential loss of institutional clout” (Wetherell, 2011, p. 402). Social psychology, 
especially discursive social psychology, has a great deal in common with history, 
especially if the theoretical claims with which we began hold true. The implication 
is clear: if social psychology is under threat, then the situation is worse for history 
of psychology. But rather than being a threat limited to narrowing of the subject or 
to invoking a particular methodological imperative, the threat is to the very exis- 
tence of history of psychology within psychology. 
In the most recent REF, the quality of publications accounted for 65 % of the 
ﬁnal  “mark”  with  the  remaining  35 %  calculated  from  “impact”  (20 %)  and 
“research environment” (15 %). Impact was deﬁned as research having “an effect 
on, change or beneﬁt to the economy, society, culture, public policy or services, 
health, the environment or quality of life, beyond academia”. Its inclusion in the 
REF was prompted by a culture and rhetoric of accountability that has a much 
longer history (see, for example, Rose & Rose, 1970). It is clear, and has been clear 
for many years, that history of psychology struggles to demonstrate the effects of 
its research in a manner that might plausibly resemble the claims for impact in 
other areas of psychology. This is consistent with a larger concern that research in 
the humanities, arts, and, in places, the social sciences has to contend with nar- 
rowly deﬁned impact agendas that are better suited to the natural sciences 
(Benneworth & Jongbloed, 2010). 
Then, of course, there is money. While research income was not an independent 
measure in REF, at research-led UK universities, the ability to attract research funds 
is frequently linked to prestige and personal promotion. It is not uncommon for 
departments to have targets for average research income per full-time academic. 
While no one is suggesting that the research income from history of psychology 
could sensibly be compared to that commanded by neuroscience, in the landscape 
of funded psychological research, history is again at the margins. Once more it 
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becomes a matter of burden: the lack of research income from history simply makes 
the demands on other staff even greater. 
The effects of research assessments permeate the academic landscape through to 
the language used in journals. In a lexicographic analysis of journal abstracts on 
PubMed between 1974 and 2014, Vinkers, Tijdink, and Otte (2015) counted the use 
of positive and negative words such as “novel”, “robust”, “innovative”, and “disap- 
pointing”. They found a proportionate increase in both but a much more marked 
increase in positive words from 2 % of all words to 17.5 % of all words, a within class 
increase of 880 %. In order to get published, researchers are increasingly using words 
that emphasise the status of their work.7  Presenting research as “groundbreaking” 
may contribute to it being regarded as such. While this might be dismissed as a trivial 
effect on journal rhetoric, we believe that dismissal would be a mistake: everything 
we subscribe to as historians and psychologists emphasises the importance of lan- 
guage and rhetoric (Bazerman, 1988; Billig, 1989, 1990; Richards, 1989). 
A further indicator of the pressures of research assessment is the almost com- 
plete absence of young academic psychologists in Britain who claim history of 
psychology as a research interest, let alone as their main specialism. We are aware 
that this has been said before and there was rarely a time when there were large 
numbers of psychologists with history as their research specialism. The familiar 
claims that history does not belong within a science (with the possible exception of 
economics) and should therefore be excluded from the curriculum have been voiced 
for decades, informally and in print. But the pressures of the REF have given these 
claims renewed traction: what was once regarded as a rather quaint but harmless 
choice of (secondary) research topic is now more likely to be seen as a burdensome 
luxury that neither an individual nor a department can afford. Needless to say, we 
emphatically reject this view. However, eligibility for the REF is now effectively a 
prerequisite for most appointments in a British research-led university and internal 
promotion also frequently relies on a person’s “REFability” (although government 
proposals to provide alternative promotion paths based on teaching are currently 
circulating). In such circumstances, and irrespective of philosophical defences of 
the historian’s position, it becomes difﬁcult to recommend the history of psychol- 
ogy as a research ﬁeld for any graduate student embarking on an academic career.8 
 
 
7 PubMed is the search engine for the major medical database Medline. The lexicographic approach 
using corpus linguistics holds considerable promise within history of science and psychology (see, 
e.g. Pumfrey, Rayson, & Mariani, 2012; Green, Feinerer, & Burman, 2013). 
8 One obvious response to marginalisation in both research assessments and curriculum design 
would be to suggest, along with many of its critics, that historians of psychology should move 
camp and become members of history departments: history for historians and science for scien- 
tists. While history of science is itself a small specialism compared to, say, social and economic 
history, such a move has the obvious appeal that history of psychology is better aligned with the 
assessment criteria in history. It would also resolve the related tensions around the appropriateness 
of the kind of knowledge and knowledge production. While we see this as a possibility for some 
individuals, it risks undermining the hope of many historians of psychology that history is read by 
psychologists (Danziger, 1994). It also risks the status of historians within psychology: there is 
nothing “mere” about institutional structures and divides. 
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When located within the larger discipline of psychology, the history of psy- 
chology fails to deliver on almost all of the criteria considered important. In the 
increasingly calculated world of universities, it generates little research income, 
journal impact factors and citation rates are typically low, published material often 
tests psychologists’ understanding of what constitutes psychological knowledge, 
cases linking research to impact are rare and difﬁcult to articulate, few students are 
attracted into research in the area, and many research articles (including several of 
our own) fail to contribute histories that substantiate the history–psychology 
mutuality. The material conditions of research assessment are dismantling the his- 
tory of psychology’s institutional base in psychology. These conditions are not 
divorced from values: they are a product of the notions of market that suffuse 
neoliberal agendas. 
 
 
 
The Crisis in Teaching Conceptual and Historical Issues 
 
 
Giroux (2002) has argued that neoliberalism substitutes the language of commer- 
cialisation, privatisation, and deregulation for civic discourse. Within the language 
and images of corporate culture that are now coming to dominate university life, 
citizenship itself is constructed as a privatised affair in which self-interested indi- 
viduals compete for resources. It follows that certain areas of psychology will 
thrive under this regime while others will fail. Some ﬁelds of psychological prac- 
tice and investigation have certainly come to prominence in recent years—and not 
solely as a result of their empirical achievements. We are thinking here of coaching 
psychology, for example, or positive psychology, two previously marginal special- 
isms that are now thriving, thanks to their valorisation of personal achievement and 
the pursuit of happiness through individual transformation based on self-work 
(Binkley, 2011a, 2011b; Christopher & Hickinbottom, 2008). Other ﬁelds of psy- 
chology are also in the ascendant, nurtured by the liquid ontologies that neoliberal- 
ism demands, as Parker (2014) has argued. But one area in particular has triumphed 
above all others: cognitive neuroscience. We are persuaded that the success of the 
neuro-discourses in psychology has not been brought about solely by their empiri- 
cal achievements but rather by a social and political context that renders their con- 
tributions evidently essential to contemporary conceptions of selfhood 
(Brenninkmeijer, 2010; Martin, 2010; Vidal, 2009). We live in an age of what has 
been called “the synaptic self” (LeDoux, 2002) or the “neurochemical self” (Rose, 
2003). It seems that our discipline has either become  overtaken by a neuromania 
(Legrenzi & Umilta, 2011; Tallis, 2011), or perhaps it has been brainwashed (Satel 
& Lilienfeld, 2013). As the neuro-disciplines continue their rise, the history of 
psychology falters. Ironically it is patient and principled historical and conceptual 
work that has done much to challenge these developments, though its impact on 
mainstream practices is sometimes difﬁcult to discern (Moncrieff, 2006; Noë, 
2009; Rose & Abi-Rachid, 2013). 
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Debates about the place of history of psychology in the psychology curriculum 
have been much rehearsed, and there have been concerns that history is often posi- 
tioned as having only a pedagogical role (Danziger, 1994). The complaints are 
familiar: the reluctance of many academic psychologists to teach it, the resistance to 
it from many students (before they have actually studied it), the doubts over why 
any science should include its history as a compulsory part of the curriculum, the 
scepticism that it requires true expertise, and its awkward relation with research-led 
teaching are just some. Equally, however, there are counterarguments to each of 
these. The relationship between history and psychology is different from similar 
relations in other sciences. A signiﬁcant number of academics have always enjoyed 
teaching it and many students are regularly enthralled by it. With the growth of big 
data and means of interrogating it, there are also new opportunities not just for 
research in history of psychology but also in teaching it (Green et al., 2013; Green 
& Feinerer, 2015). 
 
 
 
Opportunities and the Teaching of History of Psychology 
 
 
It is in the area of undergraduate teaching that we believe there are some reasons for 
optimism. Since 2001, the British Psychological Society (BPS) has deﬁned historical 
and conceptual issues as a “core area” for the undergraduate curriculum. The major- 
ity of undergraduate psychology courses in the UK are accredited by the BPS, and so 
most departments have developed their curricula with the BPS requirements in 
mind.9 The undergraduate psychology syllabus in Britain is also shaped by the 
Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education (QAA), the independent body 
entrusted with monitoring, and advising on, standards and quality in UK higher edu- 
cation.10 The sections of the subject benchmark statement pertinent to conceptual and 
historical issues in psychology (CHIP) fall under the headings “Nature and extent of 
psychology” (3.7) and “Subject Knowledge and Understanding” (4.6) and state: 
 
3.7 To summarise, psychology is a discipline concerning experience and behaviour that is 
of immense range and depth. It has evolved its own methodologies from those found in 
cognate areas. A degree in psychology implies an understanding of historical and contem- 
porary psychological research alongside an appreciation of current and previous theoretical 
efforts to integrate and interpret empirical ﬁndings. To achieve this requires students to gain 
critical thinking skills developed within a context of rigorous empirical methodology. 
(QAA, 2010, p. 3) 
 
4.6 The core knowledge domains within psychology include research methods, biological 
psychology, cognitive psychology, individual differences, developmental psychology and 
social psychology, although students will be exposed to other areas as well. In addition to 
 
 
9 One major reason for this is that a BPS-accredited ﬁrst degree is usually required for further train- 
ing in professions such as clinical and educational psychology. 
10 http://www.qaa.ac.uk/en/Publications/Documents/Subject-benchmark-statement-Psychology. 
pdf accessed 7 January 2016. 
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these core areas, it is expected that students will gain knowledge of conceptual and histori- 
cal perspectives in psychology. (QAA, 2010, p. 4) 
 
The benchmark standards insist on the teaching of conceptual and historical 
issues on undergraduate psychology degrees. Furthermore, historical and concep- 
tual issues clearly play a signiﬁcant role in all of the typical attainment standards. 
On graduating with an honours degree in psychology, students should typically be 
able to: “understand the scientiﬁc underpinnings of psychology as a discipline, its 
historical origins, development and limitations” (QAA, 2010, Sect. 7.4, p. 4). 
Because it deﬁnes conceptual and historical issues as a “core domain” of psy- 
chology, the British Psychological Society’s own syllabus guidelines place more 
emphasis than the QAA on its importance in the undergraduate curriculum.11 All the 
core domains must be assessed, although they need not be delivered via a dedicated 
course unit or module. 12 
The indicative content for the area has a broader scope that most scholars in the 
ﬁeld would embrace: 
 
the study of psychology as a science; the social and cultural construction of psychology; 
conceptual and historical paradigms and models—comparisons and critiques; political and 
ethical issues in psychology; integration across multiple perspectives. (BPS, 2015, p. 18) 
 
All of this should be welcomed. After all, both the BPS and QAA make history 
a recognised component of a regulated curriculum for undergraduate psychology. 
They endorse the metaphor we often use ourselves when trying to capture what 
psychology should be: the metaphor of “breadth”. This is also at least consistent 
with another metaphor we use to justify history: that it provides perspective. 
However, while we see the stipulations of the BPS and QAA as opportunities, to 
others they are constraints that are sometimes resented. By making history a require- 
ment, older, familiar oppositions have been renewed: staff who do not want to teach 
it yet are required to do so, many students dislike being compelled to study it, and 
many cannot see the justiﬁcation for it being a compulsory part of the curriculum. 
The result has been anger from some about why it should be compulsory and con- 
cern from others about who and how they are going to teach it. It is doubtful that 
these stipulations have improved the situation of history of psychology. Nevertheless, 
for us as historians of psychology, they do provide some reason to retain a foothold 
in the discipline. 
 
 
 
11 The BPS “core domains” are biological psychology, cognitive psychology, developmental psy- 
chology, individual differences, social psychology, conceptual and historical issues in psychology, 
research methods, and empirical project. http://www.bps.org.uk/system/ﬁles/Public%20ﬁles/ 
PaCT/undergraduate_accreditation_2015_web.pdf accessed 6 January 2016. Of all the core 
domains however, only conceptual and historical issues need not have an associated practical ele- 
ment (qualitative or quantitative). We recommend that this oversight be corrected in subsequent 
editions of the Standards for the Accreditation of Undergraduate, Conversion and Integrated 
Masters Programmes in Psychology. 
12 Accreditation through Partnership 2015/16 Self-evaluation questionnaire for new undergradu- 
ate, conversion and integrated Masters programmes (UK) http://www.bps.org.uk/careers-educa- 
tion-training/accredited-courses-training-programmes/useful-accreditation-documents/ 
undergraduate-and-conversion-pr accessed 6 January 2016. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
We have argued that the material conditions produced by research assessments and 
curriculum changes have so marginalised history of psychology that its future in 
British psychology departments might appear a bleak one. One objection to our 
analysis is clear: that we are considering symptoms rather than causes. Goertzen 
(2008) argues that we must address causes. For him, the fragmentation and crises in 
psychology will only be resolved once there is more fundamental debate addressing 
the substance of psychology’s philosophical tensions (Goertzen, 2008). On such a 
view, history’s marginalisation, its place as a tiny fragment of a fragmented disci- 
pline, will not be corrected unless deeper issues of psychology’s ontology and epis- 
temology are addressed and solved. Once they are, the implication goes, everything 
will be better. We fully accept that philosophical issues often lie at the root of issues 
of marginalisation and, equally, we believe there are fundamental values at stake 
(Smith, 2007). For example, there is no doubt that the marginalisation of some areas 
of social psychology to which we have alluded is attributable to deep epistemologi- 
cal divides. We are also aware of the deeply politicised nature of decisions around 
exercises such as the REF. However, as vast swathes of social science and history 
have shown, marginalisation of groups is rarely just or mainly attributable to philo- 
sophical tensions. Distasteful as they may seem there are more proximal factors, 
often driven by ﬁnancial spreadsheets and concerns over reputation. An analysis of 
the proximal and more local conditions is relevant if only because it is informative 
and because it is debatable whether there is always a causal role for the philosophy 
(philosophy can be read into a spreadsheet, but it need not have its origin). 
In this volume, we are concerned to enhance our understanding of the relations 
between history and psychology and particularly of how history informs psychol- 
ogy. Many inﬂuential ﬁgures in the ﬁeld of history of psychology have argued that 
psychology is intrinsically historical. As consequence history of psychology is a 
legitimate area of inquiry within psychology, and at the very least, historical consid- 
erations can inform the theoretical thinking of psychologists. These arguments have 
largely been expressed in intellectual terms, and our wish is not to denigrate them 
but to support them—after all, they are what drew both of us into the area. However, 
there is an equally noble tradition in historiography emphasising social relations 
and material conditions as vital components in the understanding of events: main- 
stream history. In this article we have shown how recent ideological shifts have 
affected British academic psychology. Managerialism and the resultant exercises in 
research assessment have often worked against the conceptual arguments for a more 
intimate relation between history and psychology. The result has been a marginali- 
sation of history of psychology as an area of psychology and an increasing risk that 
the conceptual arguments for it will be swamped by other concerns. We want to 
emphasise that we consider this a theoretical interpretation. 
We also wish to end on a positive note. We continue to believe that good history 
is persuasive and will be valued by open-minded colleagues. We believe that the 
history of psychology, though small and shrinking, can—and must—sustain col- 
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laborative activities between scholars. Within the curriculum there is support for the 
idea that history of psychology should be taught, and we continue to believe that 
teaching history to psychology students can be enjoyable and fruitful and, dare we 
say it, can produce better psychologists. 
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